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VIRTUAL PROPERTY, VIRTUAL RIGHTS: WHY 
CONTRACT LAW, NOT PROPERTY LAW, MUST 
BE THE GOVERNING PARADIGM IN THE  
LAW OF VIRTUAL WORLDS 
Abstract: Virtual worlds such as World of Warcraft and Second Life have recent-
ly exploded in popularity. As users of these worlds acquire virtual assets, con-
flicts inevitably arise. These conflicts are currently resolved through the terms of 
End User License Agreements (“EULAs”) between users and developers. Many 
commentators, however, criticize EULAs as being too one-sided and argue for 
courts to acknowledge traditional common law property rights in virtual property. 
These arguments invoke three theoretical justifications for virtual property rights: 
Lockean labor theory, personhood theory, and utilitarianism. This Note argues 
that each of these theories is a poor fit for virtual property, and that contract law 
should remain the dominant paradigm. There is demand for virtual worlds with a 
wide variety of user rights, and, unlike generally applicable property law, a EU-
LA-based contractual scheme allows the developers of virtual worlds the flexibil-
ity to efficiently respond to such demand. 
INTRODUCTION 
Marc Woebegone had found a loophole.1 By manipulating an Internet ad-
dress, he gained access to an auction for a piece of land earlier than the seller 
intended and won the auction with a bid far below the minimum.2 Woebegone, 
a lawyer, had scoured the terms of service for the auction website and believed 
that exploiting this loophole was not prohibited.3 The seller, Linden Research, 
thought otherwise.4 
The fallout for Woebegone was extraordinary.5 Linden not only unilater-
ally retook possession of the parcel, it seized and resold all other property 
owned by Woebegone—from real estate to personal possessions and bank ac-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Hannah Yee Fen Lim, Virtual World, Virtual Land but Real Property, 2010 SING. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 304, 313–14. 
 2 Id. Woebegone was able to bypass the seller’s reserve price of $1000. Id. 
 3 See id. 
 4 See id. 
 5 See id. 
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counts.6 More shockingly, Linden did everything in its power to erase Woebe-
gone’s identity and threw him into exile.7 
This sequence of events was possible only because Woebegone lived in 
the virtual world of Second Life, an online three-dimensional world developed 
and run by Linden.8 Woebegone was, in fact, merely an avatar created by Marc 
Bragg, a Pennsylvania lawyer.9 Furthermore, the parcel of land in question was 
“virtual” real estate that—just like all of Woebegone’s personal property—
existed only in the world of Second Life.10 
In 2007, after Bragg’s Second Life account was frozen and his avatar de-
leted, he sued Linden in federal court.11 Bragg argued that Linden’s penalties 
and punishments violated Bragg’s property rights in his virtual property.12 Ac-
cording to Linden, no such rights existed per the terms of service contract 
agreed to by Bragg before joining Second Life.13 Linden argued its actions 
were squarely within its rights spelled out in the terms of the contract.14 
As Bragg’s case illustrates, the tension between the contractual powers of 
virtual-world developers and the alleged property rights of users persists.15 Be-
cause courts have not resolved the issue, many legal commentators, concerned 
about the unequal nature of these user-developer contracts, have argued for in-
creased user property rights in virtual worlds.16 These arguments rely on a num-
                                                                                                                           
 6 See id. at 314. 
 7 See id.  
 8 Id. at 304, 313–14. 
 9 Id. at 313. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2007).  
 12 Id.; GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 17–18 (2010) (discussing the arguments posed by the 
parties in Bragg’s case). In Bragg’s case, the court never reached the question of his property rights. 
See 487 F. Supp. 2d at 611–13. Instead, it addressed the preliminary question of the unconscionability 
of an End User License Agreement (“EULA”) arbitration clause. Id.; infra notes 106–110 and accom-
panying text (discussing Bragg’s case). The parties settled before the case was decided on the merits. 
LASTOWKA, supra, at 17–18. 
 13 LASTOWKA, supra note 12, at 17–18; see also Andrew Jankowich, EULAw: The Complex Web 
of Corporate Rule-Making in Virtual Worlds, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 5 (2006) (noting that 
“terms of service” is one of many labels for contracts between virtual-world users and developers). 
 14 LASTOWKA, supra note 12, at 17–18. 
 15 See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 595–97; LASTOWKA, supra note 12, at 17–18; Lim, supra note 
1, at 313. 
 16 See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1052–53 (2005); F. 
Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 43–50 
(2004); Justin Ackerman, Note, An Online Gamer’s Manifesto: Recognizing Virtual Property Rights 
by Replacing End User License Agreements in Virtual Worlds, 6 PHOENIX L. REV. 137, 182–86 
(2012); Theodore J. Westbrook, Note, Owned: Finding a Place for Virtual World Property Rights, 
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 779, 804–10. 
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ber of theories, including labor theory,17 personhood theory,18 and utilitarian-
ism.19 Other commentators have advocated for the continued application of con-
tract law in determining the rights and responsibilities of users and developers.20 
These arguments focus on essential differences between real-world and virtual 
property, the rights of virtual-world developers, and the economic consequences 
of implementing a traditional property regime in virtual worlds.21 
This Note argues that each traditional justification for property rights is 
inadequate in a virtual-world setting.22 The contract rights forged by End User 
License Agreements (“EULAs”) offer virtual-world developers the opportunity 
to tailor user rights to an optimal level.23 Some virtual worlds may call for lit-
tle or no protection for users’ virtual property; others may necessitate extensive 
protections that go beyond even traditional property rights.24 A one-size-fits-all 
property rights regime, lacking the precision of a EULA-based approach, 
would negatively affect virtual worlds—harming developers and users alike.25 
Part I of this Note begins by grappling with the problem of defining “vir-
tual property,” continues by explaining the nature of virtual worlds and the 
kinds of property assets found therein, and concludes by examining the law’s 
treatment of EULAs.26 Part II examines three philosophical justifications for 
recognizing increased property rights in virtual assets as an alternative to EU-
LAs.27 Part III then explains how each traditional property justification is 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 120–127 and accompanying text (discussing labor theory). 
 18 See infra notes 128–149 and accompanying text (discussing personhood theory). 
 19 See infra notes 150–166 and accompanying text (discussing utilitarianism). 
 20 See, e.g., John William Nelson, The Virtual Property Problem: What Property Rights in Virtual 
Resources Might Look Like, How They Might Work, and Why They Are a Bad Idea, 41 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 281, 307–08 (2010); Dan E. Lawrence, Note, It Really Is Just a Game: The Impracticability of 
Common Law Property Rights in Virtual Property, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 505, 508 (2008); Jacob Rog-
ers, Note, A Passive Approach to Regulation of Virtual Worlds, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 405, 423 
(2008). 
 21 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 20, at 308 (arguing that property rights in virtual worlds would 
have negative economic effects); Lawrence, supra note 20, at 515–24 (describing the unique techno-
logical traits of virtual worlds); Rogers, supra note 20, at 421–23 (discussing the benefits of a contract 
law regime). 
 22 See infra notes 173–181, 182–195, 196–234 and accompanying text (discussing how each of 
the three traditional justifications for property rights is unsuited for virtual worlds). 
 23 See Lawrence, supra note 20, at 540–41. 
 24 See infra notes 243–272 and accompanying text (analyzing the different rights necessitated by 
different kinds of virtual worlds). 
 25 See Nelson, supra note 20, at 307–09; infra notes 235–288 and accompanying text (arguing 
that contract law allows developers to offer the optimal level of rights to users). 
 26 See infra notes 30–110 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 111–166 and accompanying text. 
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flawed when applied to virtual property.28 Finally, Part IV concludes that only 
contract law allows developers to offer the optimal level of rights to users.29 
I. VIRTUAL PROPERTY IN VIRTUAL WORLDS 
An exact definition of “virtual property” remains elusive.30 One early influ-
ential article attempted to define the titular class as computer code that mimics 
real-world objects.31 That article asserted that such code is imbued with three 
characteristics shared by real-world property: rivalrousness,32 persistence,33 and 
interconnectivity.34 Subsequent commentators have variously modified this defi-
nition,35 taken a more categorical approach,36 or even objected to the label it-
self.37  
This Part examines a class that qualifies as virtual property under any defi-
nition: assets in virtual worlds.38 Section A introduces virtual worlds and sketch-
es some of their different formats.39 Section B then explores the different kinds 
of property-like assets that can be found in these virtual worlds.40 Finally, Sec-
tion C examines the current legal framework governing these worlds: the EU-
LA.41 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 167–234 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 235–288 and accompanying text. 
 30 Lawrence, supra note 20, at 509–10. 
 31 See Fairfield, supra note 16, at 1052–53. “Code” is the set (or part of the set) of textual instruc-
tions that makes up computer programs. See J. Dianne Brinson, Copyrighted Software: Separating the 
Protected Expression from Unprotected Ideas, A Starting Point, 29 B.C. L. REV. 803, 803 (1988). 
 32 Fairfield, supra note 16, at 1053–54. Rivalrous code cannot be used by more than one person at 
a time. Id. 
 33 Id. at 1054. Persistent code exists regardless of whether it is in use or not. Id. 
 34 Id. at 1054–55. Interconnected code interacts with other code and can be experienced by indi-
viduals other than the owner. Id. 
 35 Compare id. (characterizing virtual property as having rivalrousness, persistence, and intercon-
nectedness), with Charles Blazer, Note, The Five Indicia of Virtual Property, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 137, 
139 (2006) (adopting the three earlier characteristics and adding two additional indicia of virtual prop-
erty: (1) the creation of “secondary markets” to trade virtual property; and (2) “value-added-by-users” 
—individuals who seek to enhance the value of their virtual property). 
 36 See Jennifer Gong, Note, Defining and Addressing Virtual Property in International Treaties, 
17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 101, 107 (2011) (grouping virtual property into four categories: avatars, 
domain names, virtual chattels, and intellectual property). 
 37 See Nelson, supra note 20, at 284–85 (proposing exchanging the term “property” for the term 
“resources”). 
 38 See infra notes 42–110 and accompanying text; see also Fairfield, supra note 16, at 1063 (dis-
cussing objects in virtual worlds as virtual property); Blazer, supra note 35, at 150 (same); Gong, 
supra note 36, at 110–14 (same). 
 39 See infra notes 42–61 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 62–93 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 94–110 and accompanying text. 
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A. What Are Virtual Worlds? 
“Virtual worlds” are persistent online environments that permit social in-
teraction within a graphical interface.42 These worlds take many forms.43 The 
most popular virtual world, Blizzard Entertainment’s World of Warcraft, is a 
“Massively Multiplayer Online Roleplaying Game,” or “MMORPG.”44 Each 
user creates a virtual character, or “avatar,” and then pilots it through a three-
dimensional game world in which it fights monsters, explores, and interacts 
with other players.45 World of Warcraft is billed as a game and contains many 
traditional game elements such as combat, a point system, and set goals for the 
user to accomplish.46 Advancing an avatar to the point where the user can ex-
perience all of the game’s content is very time consuming.47 In the original 
2004 iteration of the game, it took approximately 456 hours (nineteen days) to 
do this, and Blizzard has constantly expanded the game’s content since then.48 
Indeed, the game’s success—and its $1.5 billion in annual revenue for Bliz-
zard—is attributable to the fact that users never run out of things to do.49 
Other virtual worlds, such as Linden Lab’s Second Life, forego combat 
and monsters to focus purely on social interaction.50 As in World of Warcraft, 
Second Life users create avatars to explore the world and interact with each 
other.51 Instead of adventuring against computer-controlled enemies, however, 
Second Life users engage in activities that are more social.52 For instance, us-
                                                                                                                           
 42 See Fairfield, supra note 16, at 1058–64. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Brett Burns, Note, Level 85 Rogue: When Virtual Theft Merits Criminal Penalties, 80 
UMKC L. REV. 831, 831, 836 n.44 (2012) (discussing World of Warcraft and its popularity). 
 45 See Jennifer Miller, Note, The Battle over “Bots”: Anti-Circumvention, the DMCA, and 
“Cheating” at World of Warcraft, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 653, 653 (2011) (providing an overview of 
World of Warcraft). 
 46 See id. 
 47 Id. at 653–54. 
 48 See id. (tallying time to experience the game’s content); Joel Falconer, Blizzard Launches 
Fourth World of Warcraft Expansion, Mists of Pandaria, TNW (Sept. 25, 2012, 9:13 AM), http://the
nextweb.com/apps/2012/09/25/blizzard-launches-world-warcraft-expansion-mists-pandaria/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/32K8-Z2YD. Blizzard has published four major expansion packs for World of 
Warcraft and in November 2013 announced a fifth is upcoming. See World of Warcraft: Warlords of 
Draenor Revealed!, WORLD OF WARCRAFT (Nov. 8, 2013, 11:55 AM), http://us.battle.net/wow/en/
blog/11514710/world-of-warcraft-warlords-of-draenor-revealed-11-8-2013, archived at http://perma.
cc/NY5A-ZV55. 
 49 See Miller, supra note 45, at 653–54. 
 50 See Lim, supra note 1, at 308. Linden Lab “explicitly rejects calling Second Life ‘a game.’” Id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. 
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ers can design virtual clothing, shop at virtual stores run by other users, and 
attend virtual social events.53 
Game-oriented virtual worlds have social elements, and social-oriented 
worlds have game-like elements; many successful virtual worlds are a mixture 
of the two types.54 For example, EVE Online—a spaceship simulator—pairs 
combat against computer and user opponents with a complex in-world econo-
my that is driven by user resource collection, manufacturing, and sales.55 Zyn-
ga’s new Farmville 2, accessed through Facebook, challenges users to build 
their farm to bigger and more productive heights, but users must also interact 
with friends to progress to this end.56 
Virtual worlds have exploded in popularity over the past decade.57 World 
of Warcraft alone has over ten million subscribers,58 and there are over thirty 
million accounts registered for Second Life.59 Companies such as Microsoft 
maintain virtual offices in Second Life, and the eminent Judge Richard Posner 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has given a talk via a Second 
Life avatar.60 The success of virtual worlds, combined with the large time in-
vestment they require, has given rise to a new kind of market: real-world dol-
lars being traded for virtual-world assets.61 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See id. 
 54 Compare Chapter III: Playing Together, WORLD OF WARCRAFT, http://us.battle.net/wow/
en/game/guide/playing-together, archived at http://perma.cc/NWC9-ELRG (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) 
(explaining “guilds,” player-created groups that exist for purposes of socializing and helping members 
out), with Linden Realms, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/destinations/realms?lang=en-US, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/39XC-TS26 (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (describing Second Life areas with 
gameplay elements such as completing quests and collecting items). 
 55 See All You Need to Know About EVE: What Is EVE Online?, EVE ONLINE, http://www.eveon
line.com/faq/what-is-eve-online, archived at http://perma.cc/Y9QY-8LUM (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) 
(“Around 95% of every item or ship in EVE is made by the players from scratch and sold through 
EVE’s central market system.”). 
 56 See Farmhands!, FARMVILLE 2 (AUG. 30, 2012, 2:06 PM), http://zyngablog.typepad.com/
farmville_2/2012/08/farmhands.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VK5S-D9SD (detailing how users 
may recruit other users as farmhands to help on their own farm). 
 57 See Total Active Subscriptions, MMODATA.NET, http://users.telenet.be/mmodata/Charts/
TotalSubs.png, archived at http://perma.cc/TM96-LYTE (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (illustrating the 
increase in virtual-world players). 
 58 Alex Ziebart, World of Warcraft Subscriber Numbers Remain over 10 Million, WOW INSIDER 
(Nov. 7, 2012, 4:55 PM), http://wow.joystiq.com/2012/11/07/world-of-warcraft-subscriber-numbers-
remain-over-10-million/, archived at http://perma.cc/8KQU-GT6E. 
 59 Daniel Voyager, Second Life User Concurrency 2012 Summer Update, DANIEL VOYAGER’S 
BLOG (July 21, 2012), http://danielvoyager.wordpress.com/2012/07/21/second-life-user-concurrency-
2012-summer-update/, archived at http://perma.cc/A3SC-QY4C. 
 60 Lawrence, supra note 20, at 545 n.236. 
 61 See Peter J. Quinn, Note, A Click Too Far: The Difficulty in Using Adhesive American Law 
License Agreements to Govern Global Virtual Worlds, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 757, 761–63 (2010). 
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B. What Sort of Assets Exist in Virtual Worlds? 
Many virtual-world assets closely parallel real-world objects.62 A World 
of Warcraft avatar may purchase a mining pick, trek out into the mountains to 
mine some ore, smelt the ore into bars, forge the bars into a sword, sell the 
sword to another user, and then use the proceeds to purchase a pet dog.63 Alt-
hough not all of these are common activities for many in the real world—
World of Warcraft is a fantasy world, after all—each of the items involved has 
a readily identifiable real-world analogue that can be treated just like the real 
thing.64 The virtual world of Second Life is similar.65 For example, it features 
thousands of different items of clothing and accessories, many designed and 
sold by other users.66 In both worlds, the virtual objects are rivalrous, persis-
tent, and interconnected.67 The snappy three-piece suit purchased in Second 
Life cannot be duplicated and owned by others, it will stay where it is put, and 
it can be seen by others—the same as for a three-piece suit purchased in the 
real world.68 
Other virtual-world assets more closely resemble real property.69 The de-
velopers of Second Life will periodically release more “real estate” in their 
virtual world by holding online auctions.70 Users may buy the land, and then 
subdivide it, develop it, rent it, or resell it as they see fit.71 Linden Lab—at 
least at first—explicitly endorsed the analogy to real-world real property, with 
its chief executive officer stating in interviews that Linden “sold the title” to 
the buyers, and that the virtual real estate was theirs “free and clear.”72 
Users may desire these virtual assets for several, often overlapping, rea-
sons.73 For example, the items may aid progression for the user in the virtual 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Alfred Fritzsche V, Trespass to (Virtual) Chattels: Assessing Online Gamers’ Authority to 
Sell In-Game Assets Where Adhesive Contracts Prohibit Such Activity, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 235, 
240–41 (2007). 
 63 See id. 
 64 See id. For example, virtual ore, like real ore, may be found, used, bought, and sold. See id. 
 65 See Avatar, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/whatis/avatar/, archived at http://perma.cc/
MBR6-MXUL (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
 66 See id. (“[T]here are thousands of unique clothing, hair and fashion accessories that can be 
found in Resident-owned shops.”). 
 67 See Fairfield, supra note 16, at 1052–53. 
 68 See *Shai* Alfonso 3 Piece Suit, SECOND LIFE MARKETPLACE, https://marketplace.secondlife. 
com/p/Shai-Alfonso-3-Piece-Suit/160832, archived at http://perma.cc/63H7-HRJG (last visited Jan. 9, 
2014). 
 69 See Lim, supra note 1, at 317. 
 70 See id. 
 71 Id. at 312–13. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See Fritzsche, supra note 62, at 236–37; see also Westbrook, supra note 16, at 780 (describing 
items in virtual worlds). 
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world.74 In World of Warcraft, acquiring a new weapon may allow the user to 
defeat a new foe, and acquiring a new horse may grant access to a new area.75 
In Second Life, buying prime real estate for a new shop may allow the avatar 
to make significant real-world income.76 Alternately, items may provide a 
unique appearance, allowing the user to customize their avatar’s looks, or may 
even serve as a status symbol.77 
Users’ avatars have no easy parallel in the real world, but still may qualify 
as a form of virtual property.78 For example, time spent in virtual worlds often 
grants avatars certain benefits.79 Apart from the accrual of virtual wealth, these 
benefits can take the form of unique avatar skills or powers.80 As a result, such 
benefits may compel new users to purchase an older avatar from another user, 
rather than start with a brand new avatar of their own.81 
Whether or not the law sees these assets as property, many users have 
proceeded to treat them as such by buying and selling them for real-world 
money.82 Since the inception of virtual worlds, a lively market—known as “re-
al money trading” (“RMT”)—has emerged for these assets.83 Recent estimates 
posit that this virtual property market may exceed $1 billion in transactions 
annually.84 Entire third-party companies have sprung up to facilitate these ex-
changes.85 Second Life land barons have become millionaires.86 
Developers are divided on RMT: some view it as undermining their con-
trol over the user experience, whereas others see it as a potential new source of 
revenue.87 A number of developers explicitly forbid both the transfer of avatars 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Fritzsche, supra note 62, at 241. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See Alec Levine, Comment, Play Harms: Liability and the Play Conceit in Virtual Worlds, 41 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 929, 930 (2010) (detailing the story of Anshe Chung, who made over $1 million 
in the real world via Second Life real estate sales). 
 77 See Fairfield, supra note 16, at 1098 (noting that rare virtual items may have “social cachet”). 
 78 See Quinn, supra note 61, at 764–65. One potential real-world parallel to user avatars may, in 
fact, be the users themselves. See infra notes 128–149 and accompanying text (explaining the person-
hood theory of property). 
 79 See Fritzsche, supra note 62, at 241. 
 80 Id. (“With each level, players acquire new abilities and access to more difficult areas of the 
virtual world.”). 
 81 See Quinn, supra note 61, at 764–65 (noting the value of used MMORPG accounts). 
 82 See id. at 761–63. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 762. Additionally, Second Life recently claimed that it surpassed the $1 billion mark in 
user-to-user transactions. Id. 
 85 Steven Chung, Note, Real Taxation of Virtual Commerce, 28 VA. TAX REV. 733, 740 (2009) 
(reporting one popular RMT site as making $880 million in sales in 2004). 
 86 See Levine, supra note 76, at 930. 
 87 See Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1, 46 (2007) (discussing different developer approaches to RMT). 
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and the exchange of any virtual-world assets for money.88 A common concern 
is that allowing users to “pay to win” is harmful to the developer’s bottom line, 
as some users will perceive this spending as unfair and quit.89 Alternately, de-
velopers may be wary of being drawn into disputes between users.90 
Other developers, however, have embraced RMT, running virtual store-
fronts themselves or facilitating user-to-user trading.91 After originally forbid-
ding the practice, EverQuest II—a fantasy world much like World of Warcraft—
granted permission for users to participate in limited RMT, with the developer 
taking a cut off the top of all sales.92 For Linden Lab, real-money trading is not 
just tolerated, it is a selling point for Second Life.93 
C. Existing Law Governing Virtual Worlds: The EULA 
The rights of users in their avatars and virtual assets are currently gov-
erned almost exclusively by EULAs and their variants.94 A EULA forms the 
contractual agreement between a user and the developer, and describes exactly 
what rights the user does and does not have.95 For example, a developer might 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See, e.g., Guild Wars 2 Rules of Conduct, GUILD WARS 2, https://www.guildwars2.com/en/
legal/guild-wars-2-rules-of-conduct/, archived at http://perma.cc/WX5-MPJQ (last visited Jan. 9, 
2014) (forbidding buying or selling any “game Account or game Content”); World of Warcraft Terms 
of Use, BLIZZARD ENT., http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/KK4M-6BN5 (last updated Aug. 22, 2012) (stating that Blizzard does not recognize any 
“real world” transactions of World of Warcraft items or accounts). 
 89 See Chung, supra note 85, at 741. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See Camp, supra note 87, at 46 (describing the official EverQuest II auction site); Rogers, 
supra note 20, at 415 (describing the “LindeX,” Second Life’s exchange market where users can trade 
Second Life currency for dollars). 
 92 Jamie J. Kayser, The New-New World: Virtual Property and the End User License Agreement, 
27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 59, 80 (2006). The developers of EverQuest II no longer permit direct 
trading for real-world money. EverQuest II & Live Gamer FAQ, EVERQUEST II (Nov. 10, 2011), 
https://forums.station.sony.com/eq2/index.php?threads/everquest-ii-live-gamer-faq.519057/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/TXQ6-G5YR (explaining the closure of RMT services in EverQuest II). They do, 
however, allow users to design and submit virtual items for sale in the developer’s store, with a por-
tion of the proceeds going back to the player. See Create New Items for the EverQuest II Market-
place!, EVERQUEST II, https://www.everquest2.com/player-studio, archived at http://perma.cc/5AXQ-
T5P5 (last visited Jan. 9, 2014). 
 93 Julia Layton, Can I Make My Living in Second Life?, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://computer.
howstuffworks.com/internet/social-networking/information/second-life-job.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/8AAJ-ZHTC (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (noting that Second Life encourages users to make 
real-world money from their virtual-world activities). Users can easily convert real-world cash to 
Linden dollars, allowing them to effectively buy or sell Second Life items with real money. Id. 
 94 Jankowich, supra note 13, at 5. Variants include terms of service, terms of use, and codes of 
conduct, among others. Id. This Note refers to them collectively as EULAs. 
 95 Fritzsche, supra note 62, at 241. 
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agree to grant the user access to the virtual world so long as the user agrees to 
not use offensive avatar names or engage in any unsanctioned RMT activity.96 
Developers need to control user behavior in order to protect the integrity 
of the virtual world and guarantee a positive user experience.97 Disruptive us-
ers could, for example, verbally harass other users or undermine the virtual-
world economy, thereby driving away business.98 Although user restraints 
could theoretically be programmed into the underlying virtual-world code, this 
is not always technically feasible.99 Thus, EULAs offer an easier, more flexible 
way to control user behavior.100 
EULAs have been characterized as “clickwrap,” a reference to real-world 
“shrinkwrap” contracts that are accepted upon removing the shrinkwrap from a 
product.101 Upon launching a virtual-world program, users are faced with the 
terms of the agreement, and can either click “I accept” (opening the virtual 
shrinkwrap and proceeding), or “I do not accept” (terminating the program).102 
This take-it-or-leave-it approach has led to criticism that developers are ex-
ploiting unequal bargaining power, with users not getting a fair deal for all the 
rights they relinquish via the EULA.103 Such agreements have also been criti-
cized as too long and too confusing, which can discourage users from even 
reading them.104 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See id. at 242–43. 
 97 See Jankowich, supra note 13, at 8 (noting that developers need to use EULA provisions to 
minimize risk to their business). 
 98 See, e.g., Daniel Terdiman, Cheaters Slam ‘Everquest II’ Economy, CNET (Aug. 11, 2005, 
4:51 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Cheaters-slam-Everquest-II-economy/2100-1043_3-5829403.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3M7T-ETHD (relating how some users illicitly caused a 20% increase in 
inflation overnight in one virtual-world economy); Mark Ward, When the Tech Becomes Unfriendly, 
BBC NEWS (Feb. 9, 2010, 8:11 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8504520.stm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/DZH8-ZXW2 (describing harassment in virtual worlds); see also Ran Bantam, The 
World of Warcraft Funeral Ambush: An Outsider’s Perspective, YAHOO! VOICES (Jan. 8, 2009), 
http://voices.yahoo.com/the-world-warcraft-funeral-ambush-outsiders-2404718.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/84TV-KGAH (telling how a group of users attacked a virtual funeral for a deceased 
user and questioning whether they broke any rules). 
 99 See Jankowich, supra note 13, at 11–12. 
 100 See id. 
 101 LASTOWKA, supra note 12, at 92. 
 102 See Jankowich, supra note 13, at 7. 
 103 See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control 
of Virtual Worlds, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 43, 44–45 (2011) (criticizing EULAs’ restrictions on 
users’ intellectual property rights); Jankowich, supra note 13, at 15 (criticizing EULAs as ambiguous, 
inaccessible, and overly restrictive of users). EULAs can cause users to waive both virtual-world 
rights and real-world rights. See, e.g., Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (discussing a mandatory arbitra-
tion provision in Second Life’s EULA); World of Warcraft Terms of Use, supra note 88 (stating that 
World of Warcraft users have no intellectual property rights in their in-game creations). 
 104 See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine 
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2013) (discussing Facebook’s “Statement of Rights and 
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Criticism notwithstanding, courts generally uphold such clickwrap con-
tracts, analyzing them as they would any other contract.105 One notable excep-
tion occurred in 2007 in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania case Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc.106 In Bragg, the court 
did not enforce an arbitration provision in a Second Life EULA, finding the 
provision both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.107 
The decision in Bragg surprised legal scholars.108 Nevertheless, many re-
main convinced that Bragg is the exception, not the rule, and that courts will 
continue to broadly approve of virtual-world EULAs.109 Perhaps the best takea-
way from Bragg is that a EULA is a contract like any other, and that traditional 
contract law defenses such as unconscionability are as applicable as ever.110 
                                                                                                                           
Responsibilities” and noting that few users read it); Jankowich, supra note 13, at 12–20 (criticizing 
EULAs generally). 
 105 See, e.g., Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2012); Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150–51 (7th Cir. 1997); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. 
Supp. 2d 229, 231, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007); LASTOWKA, supra note 12, at 91. This trend can be traced 
back to 1996, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first upheld a physical shrink-
wrap contract as valid. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448–49 (7th Cir. 1996) (up-
holding a license even though the terms were inside the product’s packaging); see also Caitlin J. 
Akins, Note, Conversion of Digital Property: Protecting Consumers in the Age of Technology, 23 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 215, 224–25 (2010) (stating that the 1996 U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit case ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg “paved the way” for courts to accept clickwrap 
agreements). 
 106 See 487 F. Supp. 2d at 611; supra notes 1–14 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of 
Bragg). 
 107 See 487 F. Supp. 2d at 597 n.8, 611–13. Unconscionability is a contract law defense based on 
the idea that the contract was inequitable in its formation (owing to vastly disparate bargaining power) 
or in its terms (being too one-sided). See id. at 605; 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 18.1, 18.10 (4th ed. 2010). The provision in question 
would have required Bragg to settle his dispute through binding arbitration, which would have been 
conducted in San Francisco, California. Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 604. The provision was found pro-
cedurally unconscionable as a contract of adhesion—a take-it-or-leave-it contract with no opportunity 
for term negotiation. Id. at 605–07. The court also found it substantively unconscionable because its 
terms were one-sided enough in Linden’s favor to “shock the conscience.” Id. at 607–12. 
 108 LASTOWKA, supra note 12, at 95 (noting that the Bragg decision surprised academics); see, 
e.g., Francis J. Mootz III , After the Battle of Forms: Commercial Contracting in the Electronic Age, 4 
I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 271, 311–12 (2008) (contrasting Bragg with several cases that 
analyze unconscionability differently); Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the 
Law of Cyberspace: Electronic Contracting Cases 2006–2007, 63 BUS. LAW. 219, 227 (2007) (de-
scribing the Bragg decision as “so wrong on so many grounds”); Cory S. Winter, Note, The Wrap on 
Clickwrap: How Procedural Unconscionability Is Threatening the E-Commerce Marketplace, 18 
WIDENER L.J. 249, 277 (2008) (stating that the Bragg court “got it wrong”). 
 109 LASTOWKA, supra note 12, at 95; see, e.g., Mootz, supra note 108, at 309 (labelling Bragg an 
outlier); Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 108, at 227 (calling Bragg an “exception”). 
 110 See 487 F. Supp. 2d at 603–06 (applying standard contract law to a Second Life EULA); see 
also Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (stating that courts “apply traditional principles of contract law” 
in analyzing clickwrap contracts). 
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II. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR GRANTING PROPERTY RIGHTS  
TO VIRTUAL ASSETS 
Where a market develops, legal protections often follow.111 Nevertheless, 
although virtual worlds and the RMT market have existed for over a decade, 
the law has had little to say on the subject of virtual property rights.112 When 
cases do reach courts, EULAs and contract law govern the outcomes.113 Legal 
scholars, growing increasingly concerned over the possibility of EULAs un-
fairly abrogating user rights, have turned to property law.114 In arguing for in-
creased property rights in virtual worlds, commentators offer various theoreti-
cal justifications, with three predominating: Lockean labor theory, personhood 
theory, and utilitarianism.115 
This Part examines these three main justifications for property rights and 
their application to virtual property in virtual worlds.116 Section A discusses 
Lockean labor theory.117 Section B then turns to the more modern personhood 
theory.118 Finally, Section C considers utilitarian justifications for property 
rights.119 
                                                                                                                           
 111 Cf. Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (expanding copyright protection to cover computer programs); 
DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 443–44 (2d ed. 2004) (explain-
ing how the nascent commercial banking industry prompted significant changes to eighteenth-century 
English law). 
 112 See Ryan Krieghauser, Note, The Shot Heard Around Virtual Worlds: The Emergence and 
Future of Unconscionability in Agreements Related to Property in Virtual Worlds, 76 UMKC L. REV. 
1077, 1086 (2008); see also Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 612–13 (E.D. Pa. 
2007) (ruling on the unconscionability of a EULA arbitration provision, but not on the merits of the 
plaintiff’s virtual property rights). One possible reason is that many disputes are arbitrated or settled 
out of court, producing no precedent. See Lim, supra note 1, at 313–15; see also Evans v. Linden 
Research, Inc., No. C–11–01078 DMR, 2013 WL 5781284, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (approv-
ing a class action settlement between the Second Life developer and users). 
 113 See, e.g., Evans v. Linden Research, Inc., No. C 11-01078 DMR, 2012 WL 5877579, at *12 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) (granting class certification after examining a EULA); Bragg, 487 F. 
Supp. 2d at 612–13 (ruling on a provision of a EULA). 
 114 See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 16, at 1076–89 (offering primarily utilitarian justifications for 
the application of property law to virtual property); Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 16, at 43–50 (ex-
ploring utilitarian, Lockean, and personality theories for the application of property law to virtual 
property). 
 115 See Michael A. Carrier & Greg Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1485, 1493 (2007) (calling these “the three most important justifications for property”). 
 116 See infra notes 120–166 and accompanying text. 
 117 See infra notes 120–127 and accompanying text. 
 118 See infra notes 128–149 and accompanying text. 
 119 See infra notes 150–166 and accompanying text. 
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A. Lockean Labor Theory 
Labor theory offers one normative explanation for the recognition of vir-
tual property rights.120 John Locke, writing in 1690, proposed that when some-
one removes something from nature, “he hath mixed his labour with it, and 
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”121 
Under Locke’s theory, therefore, an individual obtains a property interest in an 
object simply by investing labor into it.122 For Locke, this interest was a natu-
ral right, a simple extension of ownership of the body used to perform the la-
bor.123 
The application of Locke’s theory to virtual property is straightforward.124 
Because users expend their labor, time, and skill in virtual worlds to acquire 
virtual assets, they deserve property rights in those assets.125 Users who have, 
over the course of years, amassed a great amount of virtual wealth via shrewd 
trades with other users, should have some protection if, say, a rival hacks into 
their account and steals their wealth.126 Similarly, a user who has devoted a 
great deal of time becoming skilled and famous as a virtual-world craftsman 
deserves security from having his creations unilaterally removed from the 
world by the developer.127 
                                                                                                                           
 120 See Westbrook, supra note 16, at 791–95 (applying labor theory to virtual property); see also 
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 133–46 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner Press 1947) 
(1690) (articulating the first formulation of the labor theory of property). 
 121 LOCKE, supra note 120, at 134. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See id. (“[E]very man has a property in his own person . . . . The labour of his body and work 
of his hands, we may say, are properly his.”). 
 124 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 16, at 46–48 (applying Lockean labor theory to virtual 
property). 
 125 Id.; see LOCKE, supra note 120, at 134. In Li Hongchen v. Beijing Arctic Ice Technology De-
velopment Co., this argument convinced a Chinese court to hold a virtual-world developer liable after 
a user’s account was hacked. See HONG XUE, CYBER LAW IN CHINA 81–82 (2010) (discussing the Li 
Hongchen case); Fairfield, supra note 16, at 1084 (same); On-line Game Player Wins Virtual Proper-
ties Dispute, CHINADAILY (Dec. 19, 2003, 5:01 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-
12/19/content_291957.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/69SE-F766 (same). 
 126 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 16, at 46–48; LOCKE, supra note 120, at 134; see also 
Burns, supra note 44, at 831–34 (relating multiple instances of virtual theft); supra notes 73–77 and 
accompanying text (discussing the value of virtual property to virtual-world users). 
 127 See Lawrence, supra note 20 at 521–23. Developers, particularly of game worlds, must from 
time to time alter or remove virtual items to correct bugs or “rebalance” their virtual world. Id. 
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B. Personhood Theory 
An alternate justification for virtual property rights is rooted in person-
hood theory.128 Professor Margaret Jane Radin first espoused this theory of 
property in her 1982 article, Property and Personhood.129 The theory focuses 
on the relationship between objects and individuals, and the effect such a rela-
tionship should have on property rights.130 For Radin, property can be classi-
fied on a continuum between two poles.131 At one end lies “personal” property, 
or property that has, in some sense, become fused with one’s self, and there-
fore holds value to an individual beyond its monetary value.132 Classic exam-
ples include a home, a wedding ring, or one’s own body.133 At the other end of 
the continuum lies “fungible” property, or property that may be replaced with-
out any harm to the individual.134 The archetypical example of fungible proper-
ty is money; individuals do not have personal attachments to particular bills or 
coins.135 Under this theory, the property relationship defines the classification 
because objects are not inherently personal or fungible.136 Whereas for a 
watchmaker, a watch may be fungible property ready to be sold, the same 
watch may prove to be a precious heirloom for another, and thus personal 
property.137 Although Lockean theory may have afforded the watchmaker 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See, e.g., Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 16, at 48–50 (outlining virtual property rights based 
on personhood theory justifications); Westbrook, supra note 16, at 797–801 (same). See generally M. 
Scott Boone, Virtual Property and Personhood, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 715 
(2008) (examining the application of personhood theory to virtual property and the potential problems 
that arise); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (outlining 
the personhood theory of property). 
 129 See generally Radin, supra note 128. Personhood theory has roots in the philosopher Friedrich 
Hegel’s conception of the relationship between free will and objects. Carrier & Lastowka, supra note 
115, at 1504–06 (discussing Hegelian ideas and virtual property). 
 130 See Boone, supra note 128, at 722–23; Radin, supra note 128, at 957–58. 
 131 See Boone, supra note 128, at 722–23; Radin, supra note 128, at 986. 
 132 See Boone, supra note 128, at 722–23; Margaret Jane Radin, The Colin Ruagh Thomas 
O’Fallon Memorial Lecture on Reconsidering Personhood, 74 OR. L. REV. 423, 426 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Radin, Memorial Lecture]. Radin also recognized that some property relationships may be nega-
tive—only positive property relationships that support “human flourishing” qualify as personal under 
her theory. Boone, supra note 128, at 726–28; see Radin, supra note 128, at 968–70. In determining 
which are good and which are bad, Radin takes a pragmatic approach and recommends looking to 
“entrenched moral views.” Boone, supra note 128, at 727–29; see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1908 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability]. 
 133 Boone, supra note 128, at 723; Radin, supra note 128, at 959. 
 134 Boone, supra note 128, at 723; Radin, supra note 128, at 960. 
 135 Boone, supra note 128, at 723; Radin, supra note 128, at 960. 
 136 Boone, supra note 128, at 724; Radin, supra note 128, at 960. 
 137 See Boone, supra note 128, at 725; Radin, supra note 128, at 960. 
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property rights because of his labor invested, personhood theory recognizes no 
additional rights if the maker has no attachment to the watch.138 
Personhood theory recommends affording greater protections to personal 
property.139 According to this theory, the more attached an individual is to a 
piece of property, the greater the rights the law should grant.140 For example, 
personhood theory endorses rent control laws, which place the fungible inter-
ests of the landlord second to the personal interests of the tenant.141 Further-
more, under personhood theory, personal property should become “market in-
alienable,” meaning it may be given away, but never sold.142 If, for example, 
the heirloom watch is truly personal property and thus invaluable to its owner, 
the owner should not be able to sell it for any amount of money.143 
Arguments for applying personhood theory to property in virtual worlds 
naturally focus on the attachment between the user and the avatar.144 Users 
often spend a significant amount of time logged in as their avatar, and it seems 
inevitable that some sense of self becomes bound up in the avatar and its ac-
quisitions.145 Users may develop personal relationships with their avatars be-
cause they allow users to transcend their real-world identities and depict a 
more ideal self.146 For example, the user may design the avatar to meet his or 
her wishes—if the user is short, the avatar can be tall (or even shorter, or have 
purple skin, or wings).147 The user may employ the avatar to accomplish fan-
tastic feats beyond the scope of the user in real life, such as flying or using 
magical abilities.148 The avatar may even be part of a larger network of friends 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See LOCKE, supra note 120, at 134 (explaining labor theory); Boone, supra note 128, at 725 
(explaining personhood theory); Radin, supra note 128, at 959–60 (same); supra notes 120–127 and 
accompanying text (discussing Lockean labor theory). 
 139 See Boone, supra note 128, at 729–30; Radin, supra note 128, at 978–79. 
 140 See Boone, supra note 128, at 729–30; Radin, supra note 128, at 978–79. 
 141 Boone, supra note 128, at 729. 
 142 Id. at 730; see Radin, supra note 128, at 986 n.101 (supporting inalienability for personal 
property). 
 143 See Boone, supra note 128, at 730; Radin, supra note 128, at 986 n.101. 
 144 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 16, at 48. 
 145 Boone, supra note 128, at 732. 
 146 See Avatar, supra note 65 (“You can create an avatar that resembles your real life or create an 
alternate identity. The only limit is your imagination. Who do you want to be?”). 
 147 See id. For an example of a short, purple, winged avatar, see the race of “Arasai” avatars from 
the virtual world of EverQuest II. Player Races, EVERQUEST II, https://www.EverQuest2.com/races, 
archived at http://perma.cc/BNH6-GFVJ (last visited Jan. 9, 2014) (click “Evil”; then click “Arasai”). 
 148 See, e.g., New to Aion, NCSOFT, http://na.aiononline.com/about-aion/new-to-aion, archived 
at http://perma.cc/QN43-SMGU (last visited Jan. 9, 2014) (“Soar through the skies with thrilling 
character flight.”); What Is World of Warcraft, WORLD OF WARCRAFT, http://us.battle.net/wow/en/
game/guide/, archived at http://perma.cc/P4FT-QWUZ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) (explaining the 
magical abilities of some classes of avatars). 
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and social connections valued by the user that is unavailable outside of the vir-
tual world.149 
C. Utilitarian Justifications for Virtual Property 
A third family of justifications for recognizing virtual property rights 
springs from utilitarian theories.150 Utilitarianism originated with the eight-
eenth century philosopher Jeremy Bentham.151 Under utilitarianism, the right-
ness or wrongness of an action is determined solely by its consequences: the 
preferable course of action is the one that creates the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number of people.152 Under Bentham’s formulation, “happiness” was 
simply the net balance of pleasure and pain.153 
To this end, proponents of recognizing virtual property rights generally 
offer two utilitarian justifications, one based in deterrence of negative behav-
ior, and the other in economics.154 The deterrence theory argues that greater 
property rights would expose malfeasors to criminal prosecution or real-world 
liability, thereby deterring any would-be perpetrators from acting, and thus 
increasing social utility.155 
Little such deterrence exists today, as real-world authorities often decline to 
investigate any claims of virtual-world theft or fraud.156 Police will not pursue 
such virtual crimes if, in the eyes of the law, nothing of value is lost.157 If the law 
recognized property rights in virtual objects and avatars, a thief could be held civ-
                                                                                                                           
 149 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 16, at 26–27 (describing how interactions between avatars 
in EverQuest can lead to the formation of large “guilds” and even marriages between users). 
 150 See id. at 44–46. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789), reprinted in THE UTILITARIANS 17 (Dolphin Books 1961) (1789) 
(articulating utilitarian theory). 
 151 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 16, at 44 n.225. 
 152 Id. at 44. 
 153 BENTHAM, supra note 150, at 17. 
 154 See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 16, at 1084–86, 1101–02 (providing examples of deterrence and 
arguing for economic efficiency); Burns, supra note 44, at 851 (arguing that property rights protected 
by criminal law would deter virtual-world wrongdoers). 
 155 See Burns, supra note 44, at 851. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. In 2008, Minnesotan Geoff Luurs logged into his account for the virtual world Final 
Fantasy XI, only to discover that four years’ worth of virtual goods and avatar development were 
gone—deleted or sold by a third party who co-opted Luurs’s account information. Earnest Cavalli, 
Police Refuse to Aid in Virtual Theft Case, WIRED (Feb. 4, 2008, 1:25 PM), http://www.wired.com/
gamelife/2008/02/police-refuse-t, archived at http://perma.cc/C83D-PLHR. Luurs priced the loss at 
nearly $4000. Id. When he went to the police, however, they refused to pursue the matter, maintaining 
that anything stolen was “devoid of monetary value,” and that, therefore, there was no crime to inves-
tigate. Id. 
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illy liable, or even convicted of a crime.158 Fear of liability or punishment would 
deter would-be thieves, and users would gain peace of mind.159 The result, in 
utilitarian terms, would be an increase in the overall social good.160 
In addition, supporters of utilitarian virtual property justifications argue that 
recognition of virtual property rights would increase investment in virtual worlds 
and foster economic efficiency.161 Greater rights lead to greater certainty, which 
in turn both encourages investment and increases economic efficiency.162 Users 
and outside investors are more likely to invest in a virtual world if they are cer-
tain of the legal status (and value) of its virtual content.163 Greater investment 
increases the welfare of both the users and the developers by allowing develop-
ers to improve and extend the lifespan of virtual worlds.164 Investment also en-
courages innovation, leading to useful technological advances and the develop-
ment of new resources and markets, which should improve the general welfare 
of the economy.165 Furthermore, the certainty afforded by virtual property rights 
would make transactions involving virtual assets more efficient, just as property 
rights make real-world property transfers more efficient.166 
III. THE TRADITIONAL THEORIES’ FAILURES IN THE VIRTUAL-WORLD 
CONTEXT 
Each of these three theories—labor theory, personhood theory, and utili-
tarianism—has been offered to justify the recognition of virtual property 
rights.167 The unique nature of virtual property and virtual worlds, however, 
makes the application of these traditional theories problematic.168 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Burns, supra note 44, at 851. Other countries recognize virtual-property crimes. Id. at 845. For 
example, in January 2012, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands upheld the conviction on theft 
charges of two youths who had robbed a classmate of virtual items by threatening him with a knife in 
the real world. See HR 31 januari 2012, NJ 2012, 536 m.nt. N. Keijzer (Neth), available at http://
translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=nl&tl=en&u=http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocu
ment?id=ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BQ9251 (unofficial translation); Burns, supra note 44, at 848–49. 
 159 Burns, supra note 44, at 851. 
 160 See LASTOWKA, supra note 12, at 130–31; Burns, supra note 44, at 851. 
 161 See Fairfield, supra note 16, at 1101–02. “Economic efficiency” refers to the use of resources 
in a manner that maximizes the production of goods and services. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 294. 
Efficiency increases the size of the economy, which in turn, improves the general well-being of socie-
ty. Id. (noting that “a rising tide lifts all boats”). 
 162 See Fairfield, supra note 16, at 1065–67. 
 163 See id. 
 164 See id. at 1065–67, 1086. 
 165 Id. at 1065–67. 
 166 Id. at 1101–02. 
 167 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 16, at 43–50. 
 168 See Carrier & Lastowka, supra note 115, at 1500–11; Nelson, supra note 20, at 290–92, 307–
09. 
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This Part returns to each of the three theories and exposes the problems 
posed by applying them in the virtual-world context.169 Section A tackles the 
problems in applying Locke’s labor theory to virtual property.170 Section B 
then questions the appropriateness of applying personhood theory to what 
seems to be largely fungible virtual property.171 Finally, Section C concludes 
with a utilitarian analysis that demonstrates how the recognition of user prop-
erty rights—rather than improving user happiness—could instead spell the end 
of virtual worlds.172 
A. Problems Applying Lockean Labor Theory to Virtual Worlds 
Lockean labor-based justifications for virtual property rights are funda-
mentally flawed, both in Locke’s original form and in modern permutations.173 
As Locke admitted, his theory was only to explain the origin of property rights 
of the person who first claimed the resources out of nature.174 After a person’s 
labor grants the initial natural right to a resource, Locke acknowledged that 
man-made law would step in to delineate the contours of those rights and gov-
ern disputes among rights-holders.175 Users may acquire virtual assets “in the 
wild” in the context of the virtual world, but the resources are certainly not in 
the state of nature as Locke envisioned.176 Virtual worlds are made by individ-
uals, and thus any labor done within them cannot qualify as taking resources 
out of nature.177 
Even acknowledging that users labor to acquire virtual objects, the ensu-
ing rights to them must be wholly secondary to the property rights of the de-
velopers who created the virtual worlds themselves.178 Person A’s purchase of 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See infra notes 173–234 and accompanying text. 
 170 See infra notes 173–181 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 182–195 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 196–234 and accompanying text. 
 173 See infra notes 174–181 and accompanying text. 
 174 See LOCKE, supra note 120, at 134 (“I shall endeavor to show how men might come to have a 
property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common . . . .”). 
 175 Id. at 143. (“[L]abour, in the beginning, gave a right of property . . . . [T]he several communi-
ties [later] settled the bounds of their distinct territories and, by laws within themselves, regulated the 
properties of the private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property 
which labour and industry began . . . .”). 
 176 Compare id. at 134 (analyzing property rights in acorns and apples), with Molly Stephens, 
Note, Sales of In-Game Assets: An Illustration of the Continuing Failure of Intellectual Property Law 
to Protect Digital-Content Creators, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1516–19 (2002) (discussing the complex 
client-server code interaction underlying the user’s experience of virtual worlds). 
 177 Cf. LOCKE, supra note 120, at 143 (noting that the labor-based origination of property rights 
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Park Place in a game of Monopoly should not entitle Person A to keep the card 
after the game is over if the set belongs to Person B.179 In a similar manner, 
developers invest their labor to create virtual worlds; users are merely enjoying 
the fruits of that labor with permission.180 Such enjoyment does not alter the 
underlying ownership of the property.181 
B. Problems Applying Personhood Theory to Virtual Worlds 
Several problems attend personhood-based justifications for virtual prop-
erty rights.182 First, the concept of personal property lies in tension with the 
ultimate end of many supporters of virtual property rights: the ability to sell 
their virtual property for real-world money.183 Radin’s theory contends that 
personal property, being so bound up in the person that it possesses unquantifi-
able value, must be market-inalienable.184 Individuals that treat their avatars or 
virtual possessions as personal property, therefore, should not be able sell 
them.185 Yet many users advocate for property rights in virtual assets precisely 
because they want to preserve the financial value of their virtual property.186 If 
such property is to be sellable, it must be fungible property (i.e., virtual 
cash)—and not personal property (i.e., virtual wedding rings).187 Consequently, 
the personhood approach cannot be used to afford rights to all virtual property, 
thereby losing much of its force.188   
Even accepting that personhood theory justifies increased protections for 
the subset of virtual assets that qualify as personal property, identifying that 
subset remains problematic.189 Property relationships only qualify as personal 
if they are “good” relationships—in Radin’s terms, those conducive to “human 
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flourishing,” as judged through the lens of “entrenched moral views.”190 Inas-
much as one can find a consensus, current societal views toward virtual worlds 
are not overwhelmingly positive.191 Addiction to virtual worlds is increasingly 
treated as a disease.192 Several popular television series have featured episodes 
where individuals commit either suicide or homicide as a result of their in-
volvement in a virtual world.193 And politicians routinely question the link be-
tween real-world violence and violence in video games, including some virtual 
worlds.194 Thus, even if a particular user has a personal relationship with a vir-
tual asset, it is not clear that the law should afford the asset the heightened pro-
tection of personal property.195 
C. Problems Applying Utilitarian Justifications to Virtual Worlds 
A utilitarian analysis weighs the costs of a proposed action against the en-
suing benefits.196 In the context of virtual worlds, the utilitarian justifications 
of promoting deterrence and economic efficiency are outweighed by the actual 
economic costs that would result from affording rights to virtual property.197 
In the first instance, because the threat of harm to virtual property in the 
United States is neither widespread nor imminent, the actual utility in deter-
rence remains low.198 Although virtual worlds are growing in popularity, they 
remain a niche industry.199 
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Moreover, the cost of implementing protections for virtual property would 
be high.200 This is not to say that real harms have not been suffered by the vic-
tims of virtual property theft, but rather that affording full property rights and 
importing the heavy hand of the law into virtual worlds may not be the most 
efficient way to prevent those harms.201 Allowing the real-world legal system 
to become the primary means of resolving disputes in virtual worlds would 
lead users to fear lawsuits from other users, chilling participation in virtual 
worlds.202 Because the crimes or tortious behavior occurred “on the property” 
of the virtual worlds, their developers will likely be dragged into court as well, 
with their costs passed on to users.203 Even if not joined as a party, develop-
ers—as custodians of records and experts on their virtual world—would still 
likely be involved in such cases.204 The international reach of virtual worlds 
also raises logistical and jurisdictional issues, further complicating such law-
suits.205 
Besides becoming entangled by disputes between users, developers them-
selves could be targeted by lawsuits.206 Developers could be held liable for 
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both intentional harms (e.g., stripping a user of items they use to harass others) 
and unintentional harms (e.g., bugs in the code causing the deletion of virtual 
items).207 Whereas the utility gains from granting users property rights would 
be small, the new expenses and risks to developers would outweigh any pro-
posed economic incentives designed to encourage innovation.208 
Such full-scale property protections are also inherently incompatible with 
both the short-term operation of virtual worlds and their long-term lifecy-
cles.209 These worlds are incredibly complex constructs, with developers add-
ing new content constantly.210 It is inevitable that some additions impact the 
virtual world in unexpected ways, either as unforeseen consequences of inten-
tional changes or as undetected errors in the underlying virtual-world code.211 
For example, a new skill intentionally introduced into World of Warcraft may 
unintentionally trivialize some challenges, or a new interface feature in Second 
Life may be bugged, allowing users to create items that are one-hundred times 
larger than intended.212 In such cases, the developers must take swift action to 
correct the problems before they spread.213 Such action could consist of an ad-
justment to avatars or objects in the world, or, in extreme cases, a rollback of 
the entire world to an earlier point in time.214 In either scenario, the developers’ 
fixes could damage or even destroy users’ virtual property.215 
Developers may even alter the virtual world for business-related reasons, 
again influencing the value of virtual property.216 For example, in 2005, Lin-
den Lab altered the means by which users could travel through Second Life by 
replacing fixed “telehub” buildings with individual avatar teleportation.217 The 
value of virtual real estate near telehubs, formerly prized for their proximity to 
these high-traffic areas, tumbled.218 The developers likely believed that this 
decision, designed to improve the user experience for many, would ultimately 
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be profitable for the company.219 If virtual landowners near telehubs had tradi-
tional property rights, however, the developers may have been liable for the 
reduction of their property’s value.220 
In the long term, many virtual worlds also face a common technological 
problem: obsolescence.221 Although developers may add content consistently 
across a span of years, updating the underlying code can be a much more 
daunting task.222 For example, World of Warcraft has been operating for nine 
years, but has yet to launch a major overhaul of its graphics engine.223 Instead, 
developers have traditionally focused on producing a whole sequel from 
scratch, allowing them to update technical elements while also tweaking the 
user experience.224 The virtual world EverQuest, launched in 1999, suffered a 
sharp drop in users with the 2004 launch of EverQuest II.225 Eventually, the 
expectation is that a virtual world becomes so technologically eclipsed by 
competitors that it no longer becomes profitable to run.226 This was recently 
the case with the long-running superhero game, City of Heroes, which ended 
in late 2012 after a run of eight years.227 
If the users of such obsolete virtual worlds are afforded full property 
rights, developers would be exposed to tremendous liability.228 Developers 
who wish to shut down their servers would face an array of undesirable op-
tions.229 They could simply pull the plug and risk lawsuits.230 Or, they could 
separately settle with each user who holds virtual property of value within their 
world, negotiating to buy the property or otherwise gain permission to end the 
virtual world.231 Developers could very well be induced to “constructively 
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evict” their users by not further supporting their virtual worlds and hoping the 
users are driven elsewhere.232 
Ultimately, short-term bug fixes, medium-term business decisions, and 
long-term obsolescence create serious problems for any utilitarian justifica-
tion.233 Forcing developers of virtual worlds out of business is likely not the 
scenario envisioned by those arguing for increased virtual property rights.234 
IV. CONTRACT LAW CAN PROVIDE THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF RIGHTS FOR 
EACH VIRTUAL WORLD 
With property law theories proving inadequate, contract law should con-
tinue to govern virtual worlds.235 This is not simply because there is no better 
alternative, but rather because contract law provides virtual worlds with some-
thing necessary for their prosperity: flexibility.236 
Developers are free to, through the terms of their EULAs, craft systems of 
rights that are purposefully tailored to their unique virtual world.237 The result 
is an efficient ecosystem of virtual worlds that caters to a wide variety of users 
who demand a varying array of rights.238 
This Part argues that the flexibility required by virtual-world developers 
and users makes the current EULA-based system preferable to a property 
rights regime.239 Section A posits that some virtual worlds require lesser rights 
than traditional property law provides.240 Section B, conversely, notes that oth-
er virtual worlds benefit from greater rights than those provided by property 
law.241 Finally, Section C concludes by arguing that because of economic con-
ditions, developers will continue to be responsive to user demands for virtual 
property protection, thereby obviating the need for property law protection.242 
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A. Users of Some Virtual Worlds Demand Fewer Rights 
Many virtual worlds are deliberately less protective of user virtual-
property rights.243 This springs not from some sinister desire to minimize user 
rights—but rather from the users themselves demanding a world without such 
property rights.244 
These virtual worlds purposely allow users to engage their avatars in be-
havior that would otherwise be criminal or tortious in the real world.245 The 
practice of allowing avatars to injure or rob each other exists in many virtual 
worlds today, including EVE Online.246 Developers permit avatars in EVE to 
commit piracy by destroying others’ spacecraft or swindle other users through 
various scams.247 Despite the real-world illegality of such behavior, the devel-
opers of EVE not only allow these actions, they encourage them.248 EVE’s 
continued success indicates that users find that the enjoyment of such a Wild 
West environment outweighs the risks of having property stolen or destroyed 
by other users.249 Attaching civil or criminal liability for such conduct would 
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force developers to change or shut down their virtual worlds—an unwanted 
result for developers and users alike.250 
Similarly, other virtual-world developers are moving to lessen user prop-
erty rights, having discovered that such rights are indirectly interfering with 
the user experience.251 For example, in the virtual world Diablo III, the free-
dom to use a virtual “auction house” to buy and sell items was actually driving 
users away.252 Although this auction house was a much-touted feature at the 
game’s launch, less than eighteen months later, its developers were forced to 
reverse their stance.253 The auction house’s efficiency at making a universe of 
virtual goods available to all users turned out to be unwanted by those same 
users.254 Much of the appeal of Diablo III was discovering the best items for 
oneself, rather than simply buying them.255 Restricting the users’ ability to al-
ienate their virtual property runs contrary to traditional property rights, but in 
the virtual world of Diablo III, it is exactly what market forces demanded.256 
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B. Whereas Users of Other Virtual Worlds Demand  
Greater Property-like Rights 
In contrast, not all virtual worlds are lawless states of nature.257 Many us-
ers who invest hundreds of hours into developing their avatar or creating virtu-
al goods for other avatars likely desire increased protections.258 Granting in-
creased rights in virtual property is one incentive developers can use to attract 
these users.259 For example, some users will pay for access to a virtual world in 
which the EULA guarantees recompense in the case of hacking or bugs, or 
provides user-friendly dispute resolution processes when conflicts arise with 
other users.260 Certain virtual worlds have already pioneered this approach, 
offering users attractive rights via their EULAs.261 Linden Lab, for example, 
altered its EULA in November 2003 to allow users to own all intellectual 
property rights in anything they create inside of Second Life.262 Users have 
subsequently sold their virtual creations in the real world—an attractive propo-
sition.263 Furthermore, as mentioned above, EverQuest II has allowed RMT 
and plans to continue the practice in its successor, EverQuest Next.264 
Other developers have taken this a step further and granted users rights 
beyond those found in a normal property-rights regime.265 Blizzard, for exam-
ple, offers a free “item restoration” service in World of Warcraft.266 If users 
accidentally destroy a virtual item, Blizzard will provide them with a new 
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one.267 Furthermore, Blizzard offers this service even if the user intentionally 
destroyed an item and later regretted the decision.268 That kind of protection 
goes far beyond what the law provides for physical property.269 The govern-
ment will not deliver a new umbrella if one was forgotten on the bus, and it 
certainly will not give out a new umbrella if the first was thrown out on pur-
pose.270 
In sum, a wide array of virtual worlds exist, and users are hardly con-
demned to universal mistreatment at the hands of developers.271 Developers 
are using EULAs to grant precisely the level of rights that users want—
whether that is no rights, rights far beyond those typically provided by proper-
ty law, or an amount somewhere in between.272 
C. Economic Pressures Will Ensure That Virtual World Developers Grant 
the Appropriate Rights to Users 
A EULA-based regime allows for the widest possible spectrum of user 
rights, and with such a regime in place, market pressures will ensure that this 
potential actually ripens into a variety of virtual worlds.273 Developers cannot 
afford to alienate users by mistreating them vis-a-vis their rights in virtual 
property: developers granting an attractive suite of user rights will flourish and 
those getting it wrong will suffer.274 
The saturated state of the virtual-world market intensifies pressure on de-
velopers, ensuring that they offer the wide spectrum of rights allowed by a 
contract law regime.275 After growing steadily for a decade, total subscriber-
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ship among virtual worlds has plateaued.276 With a limited base of users to 
draw from, developers must take strides to make their product more attractive 
than the competition’s.277 Compounding this problem, these worlds are de-
signed to be highly time-consuming, such that most users cannot viably con-
sume more than one at a time.278 If an individual virtual world contains nearly 
unlimited content, users have little motivation to devote time and money to a 
second.279 And once a user has invested a significant amount of time in one 
world, competitors must offer significant benefits to entice them to switch to 
another.280 As a result, companies must aggressively innovate both to attract 
new users and to retain their existing users in the face of competitors’ innova-
tions.281 Part of this innovation naturally includes careful consideration of the 
bundle of virtual rights to offer users.282 
The march of technological progress only further ensures that developers 
aggressively update their virtual worlds—and corresponding suites of user 
rights—to best meet demand.283 Every virtual world will ultimately be threat-
ened by a competitor’s newer, more technologically advanced virtual world.284 
An effective way to stave off such competition and retain users is to offer an 
appropriate level of virtual property rights.285 
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A EULA-based regime makes such tailoring possible.286 Moreover, the 
broad spectrum of rights springing from the combination of a contract law re-
gime and a competitive marketplace can lead EULAs to offer protections 
meeting or exceeding those offered by traditional property law.287 With such 
protections in place, a one-size-fits-all property law regime simply is not need-
ed, as it would quash the diversity of virtual worlds and offer no additional 
benefits.288 
CONCLUSION 
With virtual worlds continuing to boast millions of subscribers, disputes 
are inevitable. The EULAs that currently govern such disputes allow virtual 
world developers to tailor solutions to the unique nature of virtual worlds. At-
tempts to inject traditional property rights—whether based on Lockean, per-
sonhood, or utilitarian theories of property—into virtual worlds are misguided. 
At best, they represent an incoherent endeavor, with each theory mapping in-
completely or imperfectly onto virtual property. At worst, enforcement of such 
rights in virtual property could lead to liability that renders the operation of 
virtual worlds unsustainable. Instead of imposing such property rights, contract 
law should continue to govern. EULAs allow developers to appropriately tailor 
user rights to user demand, with the highly competitive virtual-world market 
ensuring that users get what they want. A property law regime would be the 
end of the virtual world as we know it; contract law should make users feel just 
fine. 
CHRISTOPHER J. CIFRINO 
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